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From the Sublime to the Political:
Some Historical Notes
Gary Shapiro
T

HE BEAUTIFUL and the sublime? Rilke, at the beginning of an
exemplary modernist poem, suggests that the contrast may
be superficial:
Denn das Schone ist nichts
als des SchrecklichenAnfang, den wir noch grade ertragen
und wir bewundern es so, weil es gelassen verschmaht,
uns zu zerstoren. Ein jeder Engel ist schrecklich.
[Because beauty'snothing
but the start of terror we can hardly bear,
and we adore it because of the serene scorn
it could kill us with. Every angel's terrifying.]1

These lines suggest that the idea of the beautiful as a self-sufficient
aesthetic experience in which we achieve a synthesis of motion and
rest, desire and contemplation, is an illusion. The illusion is destined
to give way to a more genuine experience of terror when we confront
the pure and cold poetic consciousness which is represented by Rilke's
angels. As such it is typical of a strain of modernist poetics and aesthetics which exalts the sublime at the expense of the beautiful.
Let me document my suggestion that modernist poetics tends to
give a privileged position to what has traditionally been known as the
sublime by adducing two examples from rather disparate traditions.
Martin Heidegger's ontological poetics can reasonably be viewed as a
renewal of the aesthetics of the sublime-although
Heidegger never
uses the term sublime, so far as I know-and
is explicitly hostile to
the limitations of aesthetics, conceived as an autonomous study of a
certain kind of experience. Harold Bloom does recur to the Romantic
terminology of sublimity in his attempt to construct a poetics which
will focus on the Freudian and Nietzchean themes of power and
repression. Heidegger is interested in the Ur-sprung of the work of
art, that is, the original leap or thrust by means of which it opens up
a new sense of the world; this is experienced as shock or displacement
and as a threat to what is so far established. Such displacement, combined with Heidegger's concern with death, which occupies a central

214

NEW LITERARY HISTO)RY

place in his hermeneutics, is sufficient to demonstrate the parallels
between his poetics and the classical theory of the sublime. Heidegger's basic revision of the classical theory is his historicizing of it so
that the sublime is not simply the monstrous, novel, or shocking but
is construed as the appearance of such qualities in a new epoch which
is sent to us by Being. In a commentary on some lines of Holderlin
(". . . poetically man dwells .. ."), Heidegger discusses the problem of
measure and the measureless, a theme which occurs in accounts of
the sublime. In Holderlin's lines, says Heidegger, God is the measure
for man and yet God is unknown. But how can that which is unknown
serve as a measure? Poet and thinker seem to agree that God is known
by appearing "as the one who remains unknown," just as Kant describes the search for measure inspired by the mathematically infinite
as leading to an awareness of the moral self, whose law of duty provokes a sense of awe (Achtung) but which is mysteriously unknowable
to each of us, despite it being our own deepest nature. Holderlin had
suggested that God was "manifest like the sky." Here one thinks of
Kant's "starry skies above and the moral law within." The measure,
Heidegger continues, "consists in the way in which the god who remains unknown, is revealed as such by the sky. God's appearance
through the sky consists in a disclosing that lets us see what conceals
itself, but lets us see it not by seeking to wrest what is concealed out
of its concealedness but only by guarding the concealed in its selfconcealment. Thus the unknown god appears as the unknown by
way of the sky's manifestness."2
It is worth noting that, despite the formal similarities linking the
Kantian and Heideggerian versions of the sublime, the latter has a
more pronounced sense of the wholly other. At the end of the Kantian movement of the sublime is the moral self which is at least our
own foundation, even if it is not transparent to us. In Holderlin's
poem and in the later Heidegger the ground of the sublime is God
or Being, conceived not on the lines of Spinoza's rational deus sive
natura, but as the unknowable source of our historical destiny.
Another variation on the sublime, this time beginning from a psychologically oriented hermeneutic, is the work of Harold Bloom.
Bloom sees the sublime not as a category of ontology, but of the poet's
experience and work. Each aspiring poet experiences a virtual threat
to his own existence (a real threat to his life as a poet) in the work of
a great precursor. Like the mathematical and dynamical sublime of
Kantian theory, the work of the earlier "strong" poet seems infinite
and unsurpassable, offering the newcomer the opportunity of becoming a mere imitator. In response to this threat, a few aspirants
find their poetic vocations through the experience of what Bloom
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calls the Counter-Sublime: that is, they assert a new and more powerful poetic vision which includes and comprehends the poetry of
their strong precursor. Bloom's Counter-Sublime corresponds to
what Kant calls the sublime itself, since for Kant the initial threat is
not sublime, but it is the occasion of the sublime. Bloom, however,
offers a psychological account of the objectification (or reification) of
the sublime as daemonization. The poet becomes daemonic to the
extent that he wrestles with his great precursor. Such an access of
energy and the sense of mastery tend to spill over into the thematic
concerns of his poetry, so that there is "an intrusion of the numinous"
and of "the idea of the Holy."3
The sense that Bloom is providing a psychoanalytic version of the
ontology of the Heideggerian sublime is intensified by his citation of
Rilke and the applicability of his account to Holderlin. In Rilke "the
revisionary ratio of daemonizationwas stronger than in any other poet
of our century";4 like Shelley, he "compels us to see him in the company of angels, the daemonic partners of his quest for totality."5 This
suggests a more precise reading of the lines from the Duino Elegies
cited earlier. "Beauty's nothing / but the start of terror we can hardly
bear" becomes intelligible, on Bloom's reading, when it is realized
that Rilke's "we" is that of the poets rather than of a generalized
human group. Sometimes he has surreptitiously used the "we" to designate the singular "I" of his own poetic voice. The "I" is ostensibly
doubtful of his own powers: "And if I cried, who'd listen to me in
those angelic / orders?" Crying out in one's own voice would be
making poetry by oneself. The Elegies then turn out to be elegies for
the poetic power or temptation rather than for some more generalized conception of human life. The poet alternately fears and laments
the loss of poetic power:
And we: spectators,always,everywhere,
looking at everything and neverfrom!
It floods us. We arrange it. It decays.
We arrange it again and we decay.
("EighthElegy")
The poetics of Heidegger and Bloom make little explicit reference
to the political as such. The existential thinker has ontologized the
sublime, and the American critic has translated it into essentially psychological categories which derive from Nietzsche and Freud. Nevertheless, there are clearly political dimensions in each of these poetics of the sublime. This emerges in Heidegger in the analysis of
poetry and history. The original act of institution or establishment,
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the Ur-sprung by which a novel work of art opens up a world, is said
to be of the same general type by which a state or a people acquires
a historical identity: "Whenever art happens-that is, whenever there
is a beginning-a thrust enters history, history either begins or starts
over again. History means here not a sequence in time of events of
whatever sort, however important. History is the transporting of a
people into its appointed task as entrance into that people's endowment."6 Heidegger's notorious connection with the Nazis shows that
an exclusive poetics of the sublime can lend itself all too easily to
irrationalist, fascist politics. Despite Heidegger's eventual repudiation
of the Nazis, however, even his later thinking represents another
dangerous turn of his historical poetics. Heidegger has nothing to
say about poetry in any language after the time of Stefan George,
Rilke, and Trakl. This silence seems to derive from his historical
analysis of the present as the age of technology. As early as 1936
Heidegger had described the truth of the Nazi movement as its resistance to the impersonal technological world represented by both
the United States and the Soviet Union. By the 1950s he came to
believe that the entire world was under the domination of technology,
and that literary criticism, among other disciplines, had, with its philological methods and scientific pretensions, come to be a part of a
global technological complex. Presumably he thought that authentic
art was not possible within such a world. Yet Heidegger awaited a
new sending (Geschick)of Being, which would, if it occurred, be an
external deliverance. So just as an aesthetics of the historical sublime
can authorize a commitment to a political movement promising a
radical break with the past, so it can, in its ontological version, legitimize a quietism which patiently awaits a salvation which can come
only from an impersonal destiny. (Here there is an instructive parallel
in the work of Walter Benjamin, whose thought oscillated between a
messianic, Cabbalistic pole in which a degraded world awaits divine
salvation, and an activist Marxism which finds that salvation instantiated in the Soviet Union and the communism of the 1930s.)
Bloom's psychological version of the sublime would seem at first to
be devoid of political ramifications. In fact, like some other developments of Nietzschean and Freudian themes, it is an individualistic
withdrawal from the political sphere. Yet as with so many forms of
methodological individualism, Bloom's model of individual activity is
one which reflects prevailing social norms within a given culture. We
can begin to analyze these introjected social norms by noting the
historical limits that Bloom himself draws around his project.
Working mainly with English and American poetry, he finds Shakespeare (and presumably all earlier poets) to be outside the range of
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his analysis. The tradition which he is concerned with, then, is that
from Ben Jonson and Milton to the present. The pattern of that
tradition is one in which there is an unrelenting pressure on the
aspiring poet to create his own poetic capital by overcoming the
achievements of his precursors. Competition and individual success
become the presiding values of poetry as they do in civil society.
Nevertheless, there seem to be limits to poetic expansion and innovation, which lead eventually to diminishing returns and to increased
anxiety as to whether one's new product is sufficiently new to arouse
interest. In such a situation one major form of entrepreneurship
which still remains open is that of criticism, where the possibilities
have not been similarly depleted. Accordingly, Bloom's claim that
criticism can embody the same values and exhibit the same dynamic
as poetry can be viewed as the opening of a new economic frontier.
Bloom's own work may exhibit an anxiety toward the influence of
Northrop Frye, but his position within poetic criticism would still be
more like that of the Romantics than like that of their contemporary
poetic epigones.
In contrast to such theories of the sublime, the beautiful also makes
its appearance in modern poetics in the form of a criticism which
emphasizes the coherence, autonomy, and organic unity of the poem.
The American New Criticism was a consistent effort to read all poetry
in terms of such criteria. The New Criticism has often been accused
of taking a fundamentally conservative social stance insofar as it identifies the qualities of the good society and the good poem; nostalgia
for an organic past is then seen as the motive behind the valorization
of the organic poem. Today there is a widely held impression that
only criticism oriented toward the sublime is really interesting, regardless of its political tendency. One can then be led to a reluctant
acceptance of the poetics of sublimity, despite reservations about the
moral and political context of the critical theories which invoke this
aesthetic mode. It seems to me that such views take an overly onesided perspective on the resources of the aesthetic and poetic tradition, especially of that tradition in German aesthetics which extends
from Kant to Marx and to a number of schools of Marxist aesthetics.
Let me turn, then, to a reconstruction of a somewhat neglected dimension of that tradition.
Kant's analysis of the beautiful and sublime is a summa and critique
of the ideal of taste which was at the center of aesthetic thinking in
the eighteenth century. The first part of the CritiqueofJudgment, it is
arguable, could stand on its own, apart from the analysis of teleology
in nature which follows it. If so it could be called the "Critique of
Taste." "Taste" sounds rather dated now, at the end of a century of
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artistic experimentation which has apparently overthrown all the
norms and expectations associated with the cultivated gentleman of
the eighteenth century, who was the ultimate subject of taste. The
beautiful and the sublime are, in their eighteenth-century versions,
two complementary poles of the life of taste. We should speak of the
life or activity of taste here because the beautiful and the sublime
embody two necessary dimensions of the classical bourgeois conception of the moral and social life. Such a political economy, Jacques
Derrida has claimed, "is implicated in every discourse on art and on
the beautiful."7 The outlines of this political economy are already
evident in Burke, who correlates the idea of the beautiful with the
passion of love and the sociable tendency, while connecting that of
the sublime with the desire or instinct of self-preservation. The beautiful is appealing in itself, reminding us of the tender and social passions which attract us to others; it is also the subject matter of aesthetic
sociability, becoming the ground for that mutual pleasure in the beautiful which forms a large part of the life of taste. In the experience
of the sublime, on the other hand, a virtual or imaginary threat
throws us back upon our own resources; reminded of our vulnerability, we withdraw temporarily from communication, in a pattern of
action which is analogous to that of preserving the self when we are
endangered. Kant's treatment of the beautiful and sublime takes
these same themes to be essential but grounds them in a priori faculties of human nature rather than in the empirical experience of
Burke and the English philosophical tradition. Kant continuously
stresses that aesthetic judgments must be universally communicable,
suggesting even at times that aesthetic pleasure is the consequence
rather than the ground of such communicability, as in this crucial
passage of the Critique of Judgment: "It is the universal capacity for
being communicated incident to the mental state in the given representation which, as the subjective condition of the judgment of
taste, must be fundamental, with the pleasure in the object as its
consequent."8
In a recent analysis of this topic, Paul Guyer has argued that the
claim which would make communicability constitutive of the aesthetic
judgment, rather than its sign and consequence, is a survival in Kant's
later thought of his precritical aesthetics.9 Guyer reconstructs Kant's
thought here by suggesting that in his mature aesthetic theory communicability is not the origin of aesthetic pleasure but its goal. Yet
even this interpretation of Kant's thought places his analysis of the
beautiful within the framework of a political economy of taste. Kant's
stress on the universal communicability of pleasure in the beautiful
is an aspect of the ethical universalism and cosmopolitanism charac-
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teristic of his thought. In contrast to the mainstream of English theories of taste which were then prevalent, Kant does not regard taste
as the special possession of a social elite; English theories tended to
regard taste as an aristocratic faculty, present in only a few and dependent, generally, upon both proper birth and education.10 While
Kant agrees that taste is not actually universal, he insists both that it
is potentially so and that this potentiality is presupposed in the aesthetic judgment itself. Whereas the English based their account of
taste on an empirical observation which suggested that only a small
segment of society could indeed have the appropriate experiences
and share them with others, Kant's belief that one can, a priori, suppose a common set of cognitive faculties in all men leads to a universalistic theory of beauty and sublimity. From the standpoint of
political economy both Burke and Kant are acknowledging the role
of exchange, communication, and social intercourse in the life of
taste; one limits such communication to the relatively closed communities revealed by actual observation, while the other attempts to
disclose the universal principle underlying the communication. The
other side of the communication and exchange through which civil
society is constituted, however, is the possibility of withdrawing from
it. Burke follows Hobbes in claiming that self-preservation will always
be a valid reason and an effective cause of withdrawal. In Kant's
analysis of the sublime, Burke's self-preservation is replaced by the
awareness of our transcendent freedom and moral vocation, another
move from the empirical to the a priori level. There is, then, a farreaching analogy between the dual structure of communication and
the possibility of withdrawal which constitute society, conceived on
the model of eighteenth-century political economy, and the communication of our pleasure in the beautiful and the isolating awareness of the transcendent in our experience of the sublime.
It has been argued by Georg Lukacs that the rise of aesthetics in
eighteenth-century England and Germany is tied to the need of the
middle class either to form an ideal which would fortify its precarious
position (in England) or which would provide it with an alternative
to revolution within a repressive, nonfeudal context (in Germany).11
These are important considerations, although Lukacs's account seems
skewed in a number of respects, such as in its failure to recognize a
strongly aristocratic strain within English aesthetics. What I want to
emphasize in this analysis, however, is not such global connections
between aesthetic doctrines and social movements; rather, I want to
suggest that we can learn something about the political ramifications
of aesthetic thought by noting structural parallels between the categories of aesthetic and social discourse.
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Consider the language in which Kant somewhat tentatively describes the ideal conversation which would be conducted by men of
taste. When we call an object beautiful, Kant says, "we believe ourselves to be speaking with a universal voice, and lay claim to the
concurrence of every one, whereas no private sensation would be
decisive except for the observer alone and his liking. Here, now, we
may perceive that nothing is postulated in the judgement of taste but
such a universal voice in respect of delight that is not mediated by
The judgement of taste itself does not postulate the
concepts....
agreement of every one ... it only imputes this agreement to every
one.... "12Here Kant postulates something analogous to whatJiirgen
Habermas has called an ideal speech community, in which there is a
free and full discussion of the matter at hand and agreement that
differences are to be settled by appeal to universally accepted principles and methods of inquiry. To make an aesthetic judgment is
virtually to become a member of such a community, believing that
one can rely on the universal voice of one's fellow speakers. Sometimes Kant seems to have in mind such an ideal speech situation, even
when he is apparently speaking of actual speech. Consider his claim
that "as regards the agreeableevery one concedes that his judgement,
which he bases on a private feeling, and in which he declares that an
object pleases him, is restricted merely to himself personally."13 Does
everyone actually make such a concession? In fact Kant means that
they would do so if the question were properly presented and explained. But the further query arises as to how much must be built
into the ground rules of such a situation in order to guarantee the
desired result. Here Kant's discussion of some actual speech which
touches on matters of taste is illuminating. The question of just what
such a discursive situation would be like is complicated by the fact
that, on Kant's analysis of taste, there can be no rules to which any
of the speakers can appeal to validate their claims. Moreover, the
question arises as to whether such a discussion would itself be strictly
rational or if it could consist in part of aesthetic experiences. On the
first alternative the model community of taste would seem to suffer
even more intensely from the abstraction which many have objected
to in John Rawls's analogous recasting of social contract theory. That
is, just as Rawls supposes that we can arrive at the principles of justice
by supposing what procedures would seem fair "behind the veil of
ignorance" where we are ignorant of our own specific social situation
and assets, so Kant (on this interpretation) would ask us to choose
those principles of taste which would emerge in an aesthetic discussion in which none of us knew his or her actual pleasures, aesthetic
or otherwise-that is, behind a veil of aesthetic ignorance. One model
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for the second alternative is found in Kant's analysis of the ingredients of good dinner-party conversation, which ought to include stories (narrative) and wit as well as narrowly rational speech. It is worth
noting that Habermas's ideal speech situation includes only the last
of these.14 Despite the fact that Kant's guests testified to the cosmopolitan charm of his dinner parties, there are obvious limits to this
possible model. It is a historically and culturally limited practice; even
at its best the temporary community and good cheer tends to obscure
real differences of power among the participants which are likely to
influence the outcome of any discussion of matters of taste.
Kant left the question of the relative significance of the beautiful
and the sublime to his contemporaries and successors. Schiller is
among the most important of these because he was forced to supplement his own aesthetics of the beautiful, as it was expressed in the
Letterson AestheticEducation, with a consideration of the sublime. Although beauty presents us with a harmony of reason and sense,
"beauty alone could never teach us that our destination is to act as
In the presence of the sublime, on the contrary,
pure intelligence....
reason and the sensuous are not in harmony, and it is precisely this
contradiction between the two which makes the charm of the sublime-its irresistible action on our minds."15 Schiller, however, criticized the Kantian limitation of the sublime to experiences of the natural world, arguing that art was able to keep the monstrous and
horrifying at a distance so that we might not be overpowered by our
actual fear or by a practical exigency to which we must attend. Kant
himself had said rather briefly and schematically that "even the presentation of the sublime, so far as it belongs to fine art, may be
brought into union with beauty in a tragedyin verse, a didacticpoem or
an oratorio, and in this combination fine art is even more artistic."16
For Schiller tragedy was the clearest artistic presentation of the sublime; both theoretically and in the writing of his own tragedies, he
added a historical dimension to the concept of the tragic sublime.
Schiller speaks simultaneously as philosopher, historian, and tragic
poet when he says: "Away then with that false theory which supposes
falsely a harmony binding the doing of good with a happy life. Let
evil destiny show its face. Our safety is not in blindness but in facing
our dangers. What can do so better than familiarity with the splendid
and terrible evolution of events, or than pictures showing man in
conflict with chance; evil triumphant, security deceived-pictures
shown us throughout history, and placed before us by tragedy?"17
In a recent essay Hayden White has called for a return to Schiller's
sense of the historical sublime as a necessary condition for a radical
and imaginative vision of political and historical possibilities. The con-
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nections between poetry and politics in German Romanticism do testify to a considerable extent to the plausibility of White's suggestion.
Enthusiasm for the French Revolution and Napoleon, such as one
finds in Holderlin and the young Hegel, was spurred and enhanced
by Schiller's tragic poetry and his sense of the sublimity of history.
But it seems to me that White's insight into the fundamental choice
for the historian between an aesthetic of the beautiful or of the sublime is marred by a misreading of the relations, or dialectic, between
these two possibilities in the German intellectual tradition from Hegel
to Marx and beyond. White sees that an exclusive aesthetics of the
beautiful will tend to make the historian construe the past as orderly
and complete, leading to the introduction of ordering principles such
as evolution and organic unity. A reading of history along these lines
will in turn tend to lead to a conservative politics, as White argues:
Although Hegel took up the question of the sublime, both explicity in his
Aesthetics
and implicitlyin the Philosophyof History,he subordinatedit to the
notion of the beautiful in the former and to the notion of the rationalin the
latter. It was this demotion of the sublime in favor of the beautiful that
constituted the heritage from German idealism to both radical and conservativethought about the kind of utopian existence mankindcouldjustifiably
historicalproenvisage as the ideal aim or goal of any putativelyprogressive
cess. ... It is the aesthetics of the beautiful which, as Thomas Weiskel suggests, undercuts the radicalimpulse of this tradition.This undercuttingmay
account in part for the weak psychologicalappeal of "the beautiful life" as a
project to be realized in political struggles and, more importantly, for the
apparent incapacity of political regimes founded on Marxist principles to
sustain their professed programs for the radicaltransformationof societyin
anything but the most banal ways.18
I agree with White that the use made of the German aesthetic
tradition in Marxist political regimes has tended, at best, to the banal;
one could establish this not only by looking at the dreary work of
socialist realism but even in the post-1930 writings of Georg Lukacs,
who was the most representative and influential heir of German idealism within the world of those regimes. Yet I want to propose another sketch of the history and dialectic of the beautiful and sublime
within that tradition and some of its heirs which will show that the
tendencies represented by the Kantian-Schillerian sublime did not
disappear with the emergence of the Hegelian system and so may be
reappropriated more directly than White's account suggests.
The most systematic and influential system of aesthetics to follow
Kant's Critiqueis that contained in Hegel's Lectureson Aesthetics.Hegel
held that reason not only aimed at comprehending the totality but
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that, in grasping the dialectical nature of reality, it succeeded at this
task. He defined the beautiful as the sensuous appearance or shining
(Scheinen) of the Idea, thinking of art as approximating the conceptual grasp of the whole which was completed in philosophy. Since
Hegel thought of the understanding as a prosaic application of rules
to examples, and also rejected the idea of an unknowable, he did not
divide the philosophy of art along the Kantian dichotomy of the understanding (beauty) and the reason (sublimity). There is only one
realm of the artistic or aesthetic; it is governed by reason, and Hegel
calls it the beautiful or the Ideal. But the terminology calls for a gloss.
Schiller, as Dieter Henrich has pointed out, uses "the Ideal" to designate the unity of the beautiful and the sublime, and Hegel acknowledges an important debt to Schiller's aesthetics; so we must be cautious in supposing that Hegel has simply thrown out the sublime.19
Within the beautiful, however, Hegel discerns three basic modes of
relation between the Idea and its sensuous manifestation, or between
content and form. These correspond generally to phases in the historical development of art. In the first or symbolic mode, the Idea is
conceived vaguely or abstractly and is imperfectly embodied; in the
classical mode there is a harmonious interplay of sensuous form and
conceptual content, exemplified by Greek sculpture; in the final or
Romantic mode the Idea or conceptual content is too spiritual for
any adequate embodiment in sensuous materials, including poetic
images. For Hegel the sublime is a variety of the symbolic; typified
by the Psalms of the Jewish Bible, it consists in a sense of the overand the powers of the
whelming contrast between the finite-man
world-and the genuine infinity of God. The God of the sublime is
not yet known or revealed as he will be in Greek or Christian art; he
is thought of as a limiting concept, known only as that which stands
in perpetual contrast with the finite. Hegel consistently suggests in a
number of places that Kant's entire philosophy rests on a similar
dualistic assumption. Hegel's apparent response to the Burkean and
Kantian sublime, then, was to relegate it to a preliminary or primitive
phase of art by giving it a historical nature. As we will soon see,
however, the historicizing of the sublime can also be used in precisely
the opposite direction in order to devalue the beautiful.
From a deeper point of view, however, Hegel's conception of art
is a synthesis of the concepts of beauty and sublimity. Art must have
some immediate sensuous appeal (beauty), but it must also display
the radical freedom of the human spirit (sublimity). Because the Idea
can manifest itself to the senses, beauty and sublimity can be combined in the Ideal. The same pattern is repeated on a different level
in Hegel's theory of the poetic genres. The epic world is one of self-
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contained beauty; the lyric testifies to the sublime freedom of the
poetic voice over its material; while the drama combines these aspects
by showing a world composed of both freedom and order. Hegel's
combination of the beautiful and the sublime in art conceived as a
form of spiritual self-knowledge carries with it a social meaning. To
understand art is to see the rationality of its history, and this is to
become a member of that community which has come to see that
philosophy (including aesthetics) is not simply the love of wisdom but
the actual possession and practice of scientific knowledge. The melancholy aspect of this transformation is Hegel's claim that "art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains a thing of the past"
and that its transcendent status in beautiful eras like classical Greece
and the late Middle Ages has been replaced by the science of art.20
The Hegelian art historian is a man of knowledge,in contrast to the
eighteenth-century man of taste. While Kant had implicitly criticized
the aristocratic views of the English, according to which birth and
breeding are prerequisites for the exercise of taste, he retained the
gentlemanly disdain which those views have for anything which
would introduce definite reasons and knowledge into the understanding of beauty. Neither aristocratic status nor a presumed moral
sensitivity are sufficient, on Hegel's view, to give us a proper understanding of art. To have reached such an understanding, which is
potentially available to all, is to have consciously taken one's place as
a member of the Hegelian community of absolute knowledge-the
group that Hegel designates with the word we. Membership in that
group is potentially universal, and Hegel believed that this potential
would become actualized as the modern world came increasingly to
embody its distinctive principle that "all are free" (in contrast to the
"one" or "some" who are free in the Oriental and Greco-Roman
worlds). Hegelian knowledge, including the knowledge of the
meaning of art and its history, is itself one of the important means
of human liberation. Whereas the potential universality of the community of taste in which Kant believes still rests upon our inability
to give definitive grounds for our aesthetic judgments, the Hegelian
finds that such universality is achieved by a scientific understanding
of the actual history of art, which exhibits at the same time our spiritual and political history. The model is no longer the appeal by the
connoisseur to an ineffable je ne sais quoi but the orderly exposition
of the art historian to his class (of which Hegel's lectures give us
perhaps the first example).
Hegel connects this quest for intelligibility with his account of sublimity in his discussion of tragedy and comedy. Although Hegel has
often been called a pan-tragic thinker and much has been said about
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Hegel's "theory of tragedy," it is significant that the two systematic
discussions of the poetic genres in his works end with an analysis of
comedy which suggests that it is the more comprehensive of the two
forms. Moreover, Hegel seems to agree with Schiller, in opposition
to Kant, that comedy is also the more sublime of the two forms. In
his essay "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry" Schiller had argued that
this difference has to do with tragedy's reliance on established legends
or history for its subject matter and comedy's need for invention:
The tragic poet is supported by his theme, the comic poet on the other hand
must rise to his aesthetic height through his own person. The first may make
a leap for which, however, not much is required; the other must remain
himself, he must therefore already be there and be at home there where the
first cannot attain without a startlingleap. And it is preciselyin this way that
the beautiful characteris distinguished from the sublime. In the first, all the
dimensions are already contained, flowing unconstrainedlyand effortlessly
by its nature and it is, according to its capacity,an infinitude at every point
in its path; the other can elevate and exert itself to any dimension, by the
power of its will it can tear itself out of any state of limitation.The latter is,
then, only intermittentlyand with effort free, the former with facility and
always.21
This could perhaps be summarized by saying that although the
content of tragedy is more sublime than that of comedy, comedy's
form is more sublime insofar as it requires and exhibits a greater
aesthetic freedom on the part of the poet. Hegel develops the point
in his discussion of Greek Kunstreligion in the Phenomenology.That
discussion should be read in the light of the "tyranny of Greece over
Germany" which is obvious in Schiller, Hegel, Goethe, and many
other writers of the time. In analyzing the recognized paradigm of
artistic development by means of his own dialectical principles, Hegel
is making a statement about the resources of art in general. The
intelligibility of the Greek and Romantic project of a religion of art
depends, Hegel claims, on recognizing that it tends toward the spiritual elevation of comedy, in which the audience of the work of art
discover their own freedom by finding a virtual identity with the
intense freedom of the comic poet. In contrast, Hegel describes
tragedy as a mode in which that freedom is relatively obscured: in its
plot by the domination of fate; in characterization by the actors' assumption of the masks or disguises of legendary heroes presumed to
be greatly superior to the men of today; and in the radical of presentation by the somewhat mysterious role of the poet himself, who
stands somewhere behind or outside his production. In the spirit of
Schiller, then, Hegel can declare unreservedly that Antigone is the
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most beautiful of all works of art, either ancient or modern; but he
also speaks of the unparalleled spiritual elevation, or sublime character, of Aristophanic and Shakespearean comedy.
The sublime freedom of comedy consists in the realization that we
have the same freedom to shape our social and political lives which
the comic poet has as a creator. Hegel's description of the comic state
of mind is quite similiar to Kant's account of the return to the true
self which is provoked by the sublime in nature: "What this selfconsciousness beholds is that whatever assumes the form of essentiality over against it, is instead dissolved in it-in its thinking, its
existence, and its action-and is at its mercy. It is the return of everything universal into the certainty of itself which, in consequence,
is this complete loss of fear and of essential being on the part of all
that is alien."22
There is a fairly direct line which leads from Hegel's apotheosis of
comedy to Marx's poetics. The line is complicated by the fact that two
philosophers of the Hegelian school, at least one of whom Marx
studied carefully, devoted great efforts to clarifying the relations of
the beautiful, the sublime, and the comic. F. T. Vischer and Karl
Rosenkranz both argued in effect, as does Hayden White, that Hegel
had unduly restricted the sphere of the aesthetic by limiting it to the
beautiful. Vischer's early work On the Sublime and the Comic set the
pattern for his later massive and encyclopedic Aesthetik,which was
one of the most influential works of German aesthetics in the second
half of the century. Vischer's argument was that Hegel had unduly
restricted the artistic and aesthetic by considering them only in terms
of the beautiful. He implicitly claimed to out-Hegel Hegel by finding
the beautiful to be only the first or immediate moment of the aesthetic. The second is the sublime, understood as the negation of the
beautiful and susceptible of fine discriminations into various forms.
The final, reconciling moment is the comic, conceived as combining
the immediate appeal of the beautiful with the disparity and conflict
typical of the sublime. Rosenkranz's Aestheticsof the Ugly employs a
similar structure, although he thinks of the ugly as the more inclusive
negative aesthetic concept.23
Marx's own aesthetics is expressed in the form of a number of
comments scattered about in his discussions of many subjects. This
makes it difficult to assess in its entirety, and the problem is complicated by the fact that so many writers have claimed to speak in Marx's
name. Yet while Marx does say, in the 1844 Manuscripts, that "man
also creates according to the laws of beauty," we ought not to suppose
on these grounds that he adhered to a one-sided aesthetics of the
beautiful. Rather than making one more attempt to synthesize Marx's
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many fragments on art and the aesthetic, it is possible, in the spirit
of Hayden White's analysis in Metahistory,to investigate the poetics
implicit in Marx's own writings. When we do so we see that the comic
mode plays a role analogous to that which it is given in the theories
of Schiller, Hegel, and some of Hegel's students. Marx begins one of
his most extended historical narratives of his own times, TheEighteenth
Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, with an allusion to Hegel, tragedy, and
comedy: "Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of
great importance occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add, the first
time as tragedy, the second as farce."24 The dominant images of the
EighteenthBrumaire are drawn from the comic theater, the farce, and
the carnival. This parodic theme is pervasive in Marx's writings,
arising from his early adoption of the Hegelian view that "the final
phase of a world-historical form is its comedy."25 To see history as a
comedy is, as Marx says in the second paragraph of the Eighteenth
Brumaire, to realize that "men make their own history, but they do
not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all
the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the
living."26
Comic self-awareness is connected, as in Schiller, with the sense of
previous history as a powerful and irrational force. The comic consciousness that we do make our own history within such limitations
is a more precise and articulate version of Schiller's comic sublime.
Marx, then, does not adopt an uncritical aesthetics of the beautiful
but announces that "the social revolution of the nineteenth century
cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future."27
That is, it is only through the purgation of the comic sublime that
men can proceed to the point of genuine historical action. As early
as 1843, in his Critique of Hegel's Philosophyof Right, after explaining
his view that each world-historical epoch ends in comedy, Marx asks:
"Why should history proceed in this way? So that mankind shall separate itself gladly from its past."28 The comic sublime, like Schiller's
contemplation of the tragedy of history, requires a radical break with
the presumed continuity of purpose which conservatives evoke in
their defense of established politics. The ideal of universal communicability is abandoned as the differences between conservative and
radical views of the same historical events are emphasized. Louis Napoleon is not a heroic agent but a farcical clown, and his attempt to
wear the heroic costume of his uncle is a travesty of the way in which
the French Revolution of 1789 took on the trappings of Roman republican virtue. Of the many thinkers who have attempted to develop
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a Marxist poetics, it is Mikhail Bakhtin who is closest to Marx's vision
of the comic sublime. Bakhtin's attempt in his book on Rabelais is
precisely to show how the conventional aesthetics of beauty has
blinded most literary critics to the liberating possibilities of the carnivalesque.29 As Bakhtin understands it, the carnival enacts just the
sort of reversal which Marx narrates in the EighteenthBrumaire. Marx
in fact enlarged on the genre in Herr Vogt, a long sequel to the EighteenthBrumaire, in which Rabelaisian techniques and allusions are employed in order to deflate the lies and pretensions of a German propagandist for Louis Napoleon.30
Marx's original plan was to call this work Da-Da Vogt, Da-Da being
the Algerian translator of Louis Napoleon, in order to suggest that
Vogt was a mere ventriloquist's dummy. But Marx, like the Dadaists
of the twentieth century, may also have been attracted by the childish
and nonsensical sound of the phrase, since he wanted to suggest, as
they did, that there was something senseless and chaotic in established
or official reality. Marx reluctantly gave in to the more sober Engels,
who had urged him to give his book a more intelligible title, but not
until he had said that "the fact that Da-Da will puzzle the philistine
pleases me and fits well into my system of mockery and contempt."31
I am suggesting that Marx is to be taken seriously when he speaks of
a systemof mockery and contempt and that we can find the theoretical
origins of that system in the aesthetics of the sublime and its literary
exemplars in Rabelais, Shakespeare's Falstaff, and the other carnivalesque figures which people Herr Vogt.
Marx's extensive notes on the aesthetics of F. T. Vischer, made just
a year or two before the composition of Herr Vogt, show him taking
an explicit interest in Vischer's account of the sublime. Vischer's discussion of the measureless seems to have helped Marx to formulate
the economic categories of Capital and other later writings. Capital
has a tendency toward a continuous and monstrous development in
which every boundary of measure is left behind. Like the Kantian
mathematical sublime, capital can expand indefinitely as an objective
and threatening presence. But the true or deeper movement of the
sublime is provided by the demonstration, carried out at the beginning of Capital, that money and the fetishism of commodities are
human constructions which can be modified or displaced by other
human acts.
Marxist aesthetics after Marx can hardly be considered as an integral theory; White's suggestion that Marxism is committed to an
aesthetics of the beautiful is true only of one tendency within the
many schools of Marxist aesthetics. Lukacs is doubtless the most interesting and significant thinker who fits White's description. Al-
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though Lukacs's earlier writings were exemplary explorations of
tragic and existential themes, his mature aesthetics of the 1930s and
later is oriented toward a classical conception of beauty. As Fredric
Jameson has shown, that concern expresses itself through a concentration on narrative forms which is governed by Hegel's analysis of
the epic as presenting an integrated world. The epic world is structured by "natural" relations between man and nature, man and other
men, and man and his products; it may include tragic conflict, but
as "an answer without a question" it has no room for the forms of
alienation which Marx and Lukacs thought of as characterizing
modern life.32 Lukacs's later discussions of European realism of the
nineteenth century are explorations of the deformation of the epic
ideal under capitalism and of the promise of its revival. For Lukacs
it was important both to envision the entire literary tradition as
moving toward or falling away from this goal and to construct a
history of aesthetics in which Hegel and Marx emerge as theorists of
the beautiful rather than the sublime. Especially revealing is Lukacs's
long essay on Marx's notes on Vischer. While noting that Vischer
appealed to Marx because he made an attempt to comprehend the
realistic art of the nineteenth century, Lukacs fails to observe that
Marx also developed and was stimulated by Vischer's attempt to restore the element of the sublime.33 Similarly, insofar as he invokes
the authority of Hegel, Lukacs construes his aesthetics in terms of
the opposition between ancient and modern narrative rather than
recognizing the development toward comic freedom which Hegel always sees as the dissolution (Aufl6sung) or elimination of art. Through
this systematic repression of Hegelian comedy and Marxist Dadaism,
Lukacs denies himself the theoretical and critical concepts which
would have allowed him to see the liberating power of modernism.
Walter Benjamin and T. W. Adorno attempted to keep faith with
the spirit of early Lukacs while often engaged in conflict with the
beautified Hegelianism of later Lukacs. This leads to an emphasis on
the sublime in their work which has often led their critics to regard
them as tragic and pessimistic thinkers. To put the matter briefly in
a formula which will soon be unpacked, we can say that Benjamin's
fundamental tendency is to think the sublime, although he occasionally makes a desperate grasp for the beautiful, while Adorno sees the
beautiful as of the first importance for the arts but that he is obsessively conscious of our distance from that beauty and that the articulation of that distance makes him into a practical critic of the sublime. This formula is meant to aid in understanding how it is, as a
recent commentator on the Frankfurt school has said, that "the work
of each is the only corrective for that of the other," and that they are
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(to use Adorno's language now) "torn halves of an integral freedom,
to which however they do not add up."34
Benjamin's early book on the seventeenth-century Trauerspielis notable for its renewal of the critical concept of allegory. To see Trauerspiel as allegory is to recognize a significant artistic mode which does
not aim at a harmony in the realm of beautiful appearance but which
is structured by the discontinuity of allegorical vehicle and its ultimate
referent. This sense of gaps, discontinuities, and tensions is perhaps
the most impressive single aspect of Benjamin's criticism. It is stated
quite clearly in his analysis of translation. As a translator of Baudelaire and Proust, Benjamin came to see that he, and all translators,
were faced with the fundamental choice between creating a self-sufficient poem or text in their own language or of letting the strangeness, specificity, and haecceity of the work to be translated shine
through the words of one's own language, even if the latter could
not be an integral work of art. The goal of this juxtaposition is the
pursuit of what Benjamin calls a "pure language." In translation, he
says, "the great motif of integrating many tongues into one true language is at work.... If there is such a thing as a language of truth,
the tensionless and even silent depository of the ultimate truth which
all thought strives for, then this language of truth is-the true language. And this very language, whose divination and description is
the only perfection a philosopher can hope for, is concealed in concentrated fashion in translations."35 For Benjamin, then, it is important that a translation not produce the illusion of beauty but that it
serve as a means of provoking the awareness of an infinite and probably impossible task (note the hypothetical "if there is a language of
truth ... "). In other words, translation must, by the shock arising
from the confrontation of two incongruous languages, produce an
awareness of that unattainable linguistic totality which lies beyond all
finite languages.
The pattern exhibited in Benjamin's thought of the linguistic sublime is paradigmatic for his general approach to art and history. Perhaps all of these aspects of his work can be traced to a kind of gnostic
thinking according to which history is a panorama of the fallen and
degraded which is occasionally illuminated by traces of a fuller and
more human life. It then becomes the task of the critic, as of the
translator, to awaken these traces in order to provoke some consciousness of that which lies beyond them and to which they testify.
In the "Theses on the Philosophy of History" we read that "[t]he past
carries with it a temporal index by which it is referred to redemption.
There is a secret agreement between past generations and the present
one. Our coming was expected on earth. Like every generation that
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preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a
power to which the past has a claim. That claim cannot be settled
cheaply. Historical materialists are aware of that."36
The historical sublime in Benjamin represents something of a return from Hegel to Schiller. "The historical materialist must abandon
the epic element in history ... [he] explodes the epoch out of its
reified 'historical continuity,' and thereby lifts life out of this epoch,
and the work out of the life work."37 Materialism is a break with the
contemplative idealism which tends to see history as rounded and
complete, as in Hegel's view of the classical epic.
Adorno's conceptions of beauty and sublimity can be found in his
reading of the Odyssey.Schiller, in his essay "On the Sublime," had
already presented the story as a conflict of the beautiful and the
sublime: "The beauty displayed by the figure of the goddess Calypso
enchanted the brave son of Ulysses, and by the power of her charms
she long held him captive on her island. For a long time he believed
he was worshipping an immortal divinity, yet he lay only in the arms
of lust-but suddenly a sublime impression overcame him in the
guise of Mentor: he recollected his higher mission, cast himself into
the waves, and was free."38 Making allowances for the fact that
Schiller is following Fenelon's Adventuresof Telemachusrather than the
Homeric Odyssey,it is worth noting that Adorno's interpretation of
the story expresses precisely the opposite evaluation. While Schiller
(in a Kantian spirit) praises the sublime state of mind which allows
the man enthralled by Calypso to take his leave, Adorno reads the
story as an allegory of the unhappy sacrifice of beauty that must be
performed by the man of reason and duty. The beauty of the mythical world which Odysseus leaves behind is not only the promise of
happiness but its seal and confirmation. The sublime character who
abandons happiness and beauty is, on his view, the first example of
the prudent, patriarchal, and enlightened character who values rational calculation and the domination of nature more highly than he
does instinctual satisfaction. Adorno's reading is also markedly different from the Hegelian view of the epic world (adopted also by
Lukacs) as exhibiting a fundamental unity of man and nature, passion
and spirit. While Schiller was able to protect his view of Homer's
naivete by considering the later "sentimental" version of the story by
Fenelon, Adorno sees the hero as "a prototype of the bourgeois individual." He reads back into Homer those characteristics of the isolated hero which Hegel and Lukacs saw as features of post-epic narrative: "Odysseus, too, is the self who always restrains himself and
forgets his life, who saves his life and yet recalls it only as wandering."39 The encounter with the Sirens is paradigmatic: through
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his cunning Odysseus is able to hear their beautiful song, but this
requires not only his domination of his crew, but also, since he is
bound, the sacrifice of a natural connection between music and erotic
activity.
Most of Adorno's discussions of the arts have to do with the modern
era, in which taste is no longer a viable concept. Authentic art is
possible now only in the mode of the sublime, testifying to the radical
degradation of the world and to the loss of a real community of artist
and audience. Adorno agrees with Benjamin that in a world of fragmentation and destruction art can indirectly point the way to something quite different only through the integrity of its form and its
refusal to compromise with prevailing ideology. Yet the essay on
Odysseus reveals a genuine nostalgia for the beautiful which has a
quite different orientation than Benjamin's messianic expectations.
Adorno must, like Odysseus, exact a heavy price from himself in
order to enjoy such nostalgic happiness and beauty even in vicarious
fashion; he condemns himself to the labor of the negative, that is, of
delineating the many forms of the grotesque and terrible sublime
presented by culture after Auschwitz. Even the Homeric Greeks are
no longer the normal and happy children which they still were for
Marx.
Other variations on the priority of the beautiful or sublime appear
in the various thinkers of the Frankfurt school. Herbert Marcuse's
fundamental debt to Schiller, specifically to the Schiller of the Letters
on AestheticEducation, is apparent in his many attempts to show that
beauty is the promise of happiness. The younger thinkers of the
school, such as Habermas and Apel, have differentiated themselves
from their elders by a systematic repression of the aesthetic for the
sake of articulating the constitutive features of rational community
and discourse. Lacking an aesthetics of their own, their vision of social
change has neither the tragic nor comic dimensions so prominent in
Marx's rhetoric. The projected growth of rational community in their
works, then, takes on much of the flavor of liberal theories of the
late nineteenth century, which also tended to lack poetic vision. A
significant irony is to be found in Karl-Otto Apel's attempt to remedy
the lack of an aesthetics in his version of critical theory through an
enthusiasm for the philosophy of Charles Peirce.40 While it is true
that Peirce has a hierarchical concept of the normative sciences in
which logic depends on ethics and ethics on aesthetics, Peirce's aesthetics is itself a very generalized and diluted version of Schiller's
conception of beauty which again, like Marcuse's adaptation, tends
to omit the dimension of the sublime. How much richer are the resources of the German tradition of philosophical aesthetics which
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Apel might have adapted more directly rather than through Peirce's
interesting but attenuated reconstruction.
It was the task of the eighteenth century to articulate the duality
of the beautiful and the sublime as a way of comprehending the
alternatives of the aesthetic life, and of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to develop the consequences of taking one or the other
of these alternatives to have a special priority. Throughout such discussions there is generally some significant affinity with the social and
the political, which has been eclipsed in much of the aesthetic thought
and literary theory of the twentieth century. An emphasis on formal
structure, for example, although perhaps ultimately deriving from a
Kantian conception of the beautiful, will tend to ignore Kant's own
emphasis on universal communicability (and therefore universal community) as the goal of the contemplation of form. Kant's early Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and Sublime is a very revealing
work in this context. Although slight in strictly conceptual content,
the essay shows a refreshing tendency to take aesthetic categories as
simultaneously moral and social. Thus it is not only literary works
and landscapes, but also passions, individual and national characters,
the division of the sexes, and virtuous dispositions of different sorts
which are classified as beautiful or sublime. The lesson to be learned
is neither that we adopt Kant's quaint if suggestive classifications
(Italy is beautiful, England is sublime) nor that we learn to do the
same thing more accurately. Rather, we might use such an approach
as the antidote to those currents in contemporary aesthetic theory
and practice which deliberately seek to repress the moral and political
aspects of the artistic. No doubt there is a lesson to be learned from
the fact that the tradition of the beautiful and the sublime has survived most obviously in some of the branches of Marxist aesthetics
and criticism. We might also note (contrary to White's thesis again)
that the Marxist tradition, like the eighteenth century, has kept alive
the idea that the very tension between the beautiful and the sublime
is fruitful and need not be reduced to an absolute priority of one or
the other.
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